THE CIVIL WAR PUZZLE REVISITED: THE USE OF POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS AS PART OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

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Can post-conflict elections be used as a tool for peace? Existing research shows that post conflict elections produce even more conflict. However, what much of the existing research fails to consider the instances of credible third party involvement in these elections. Using an event history model with a cross-national dataset of civil wars, I show that elections as part of a peace agreement, when overseen by third party observers, significantly reduce chances of a return to conflict. This evidence offers conditions that help reduce the likelihood of conflict, and has major ramifications for both scholars and policy-makers.

Key Words: Civil War, Elections, Peacekeeping, Democratization

1. Introduction

Existing literature shows post-conflict elections between a former rebel group and a state can result in a return to violence. However, during the post-Cold War era, we have seen a number of violent non-state actors transition into legitimate political parties without any violent conflict (i.e. UNRG in Guatemala, GAM in Indonesia and UNITA in Angola). For example, the Salvadoran civil war lasted for twenty-one years and cost nearly 80,000 lives (Hironaka 2009). Eventually, the FMLN and the Salvadoran government fought to a stalemate with both sides looking toward alternatives to conflict.[1] The FMLN become a legitimate political party and competed in the 1994 Salvadoran elections. In 2005, they won a legislative majority. In 2009, they won the presidency. The situation in El Salvador is not a singular event, so what does this example demonstrate about post-conflict elections

Previous research indicates that post-conflict elections occur in the absence of institutionalized electoral competition. As a result, elections can be the start of a breakdown of peace agreements and a quick return to fighting. Thus, scholars generally view

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[1.] Compromise was required of both sides. The Salvadoran government realized that a more equal distribution of wealth was required to hold onto power. Whereas the FMLN realized they would not be able to achieve their goals of social revolution through the peace process. As a result, the United Nations began peace negotiations between the two sides with the expectation that the FMLN would disarm and both sides would eventually compete in democratic elections (Paris 2004).

post-conflict elections as having a negative effect on peace agreements. After considering the positive results after the peace agreements in the Salvador civil war, I found other instances of elections having a positive affect after civil war peace agreements. Sixty-nine state and rebel groups signed peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011. All of the peace agreements contained provisions for elections, yet forty-eight of those cases did not result in a return to violence. If post-conflict elections adversely affect peace settlements, why have these forty-eight cases not seen a reoccurrence of conflict? One variable is prominent among all of the peace agreements, third party oversight. Of these sixty-nine cases, third parties oversaw eighty-five percent of them.[2]

This paper offers a robust test of Matanock's (2012) theoretical framework to examine whether post-conflict elections result in a lower probability of returning to conflict when a required as part of a peace agreement. Such a puzzle is important for both scholars of conflict as well as policy-makers interested in conflict resolution. A better understanding of the function of post-conflict elections allows interested parties to possibly avoid a reoccurrence of violence. While answers to this puzzle are certainly not new, much of the scholarship surrounding post-conflict elections argues that elections have a decidedly negative impact on peace settlements. The key variable is the third party.

Post-conflict elections have a greater probability of reducing conflict, as seen in the El Salvador example, when a third party intervenes and includes elections in the peace agreement then oversees these elections. The absence of third parties in empirical studies of post-conflict elections suggests a significant shortcoming within the theoretical explanations and empirical tests concerning the role of post-conflict elections. As existing literature fails to theoretically and empirically account for third party observers during the peace process, scholars miss the effect of third party oversight. Third party oversight can allow for conditions in which elections can have a positive impact on a peace settlement and negate a return to violence.

Institutionalized electoral competition is often present in democracies and promotes legitimate elections. In conflict-prone societies, the system of elections lack institutionalized electoral competition. In fact, they lack the rules and regulations consistent with those in consolidated democracies.[3] In conflict-prone societies, parties are often weaker, less stable, and more regionally focused than those in mature democracies (Tavits 2008). Sometimes party competition in conflict-prone societies can quickly develop institutionalized electoral competition, but not always (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). The nature of the election system in a conflict-prone society without oversight is prone to corruption. The system can make the loser (often times the rebel group) become disillusioned with the democratic process, and the group will see violence to be the only course of action.[4] In these instances, it makes sense that elections would have a negative impact upon peace agreements. A return to violence would be a probable outcome. In cases where there is no institutionalized

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[2.] Data was taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset. The numbers include both partial and full peace agreements

[3.] For example, campaign finance laws, how parties select candidates, when elections take place, and how votes are counted.

[4.] This is if elections are held at all. In many cases either the rebel group or the government backs out due to dissatisfaction with the electoral process.

electoral competition, a credible third party is useful, even necessary, to oversee elections and ensure a democratic electoral process.

Using credible third parties as observers, post-conflict societies can successfully experience institutionalized competition between political parties (Balch-Lindsay et al 2008, Steinert and Grimm 2014). Indeed, credible third parties are a critical part of the peace process. Because conflict is expensive, warring parties are motivated to use elections to obtain resources more efficiently. As part of the negotiated settlement process, when moderated by a credible third party, elections act as a mechanism to incentivize cooperation between the rebel group and the state. The third party creates a framework and timeline for elections, establishes transparent assessments of the process, and holds representatives accountable for violations within the electoral process (Matanock 2012). In these instances, when the electoral process is transparent and institutionalized by a third party, all parties involved are compelled to accept the results, even if one group loses the election. This eventually becomes self-enforcing even after the third party leaves (Fearon 2011).

I use an event history model to show that when controlling for third party enforcement of the provision of elections within peace settlements, elections decrease the likelihood of returning to conflict. In doing so, this paper successfully bridges the gap between literature involving democratization, elections, and peacekeeping. The results further advance and test a theoretical argument in which competitive elections can be used through an institutionalized framework governed by a third party to forgo the return to conflict. Thus, it allows for a better understanding of how conflict can be avoided in the future.

2. The Negative Effect of Elections

Numerous scholars have attempted to uncover the conditions under which elections can be used to decrease the likelihood of conflict (Ryan 1994, Irvin 1999, Neumann 2005, Richards 2007, Soderberg 2007). The literature argues that elections are, at best, inefficient in resolving conflict, and, at worst, dangerous by allowing for the exacerbation of conflict. From an academic standpoint, there is reason to suspect this is true. Some scholars argue that violence is a significant aspect of elections in post-conflict society due to poorly institutionalized mechanisms for competition (Mansfield 2005, Diamond 2006, Collier 2011). In these cases, electoral and party systems are weak and unstable. Both the existing parties and the electoral system are more likely to collapse. Furthermore, there is a poor connection between political parties and voters because new parties lack resources to mobilize participation from the citizenry (Reilly 2002, Diamond 2006).

This results in a disparity between the mass population and political elites. It cultivates an environment wherein elites can violate electoral rules with impunity from the masses (Matanock 2012). Electoral and party systems characterized as such, are certainly not conducive to legitimate, democratic, and peaceful transitions of power. Likewise, rebel groups that commit to such a system quickly become frustrated with both the electoral process and the outcome itself (Wilkinson 2009). Consequently, they are more likely to see conflict as a more efficient method to grab power (Toft 2009).

   Existing literature misses two important pieces of the puzzle regarding post-conflict elections and peace negotiations. 1) Much of the research thus far, has failed to account for the role of third parties in theoretical and empirical analyses. 2) Other literature demonstrates that elections are a positive aspect of regime change. As Flores and Nooruddin (2012) argue, "elections are a foundational aspect of democratic politics. They are capable of serving a broader purpose, even in post-conflict democracies, where mechanisms for democratic competition are traditionally underdeveloped." In such instances, a transparent framework, governed by a credible external actor, is useful in constraining domestic actors throughout the process. Given this appropriate framework, elections should generally be used in a manner that adheres to principles of democratic governance.

3. The Positive Effect of Elections

Scholars have argued that parties and elections are a significant and conventional part of the democratic process (Schattschneider 1942, Reilly 2006). Elections act as critical pieces to democratic processes and the theoretical cornerstones to stable and healthy democratic institutions. They legitimize public authority, and provide policy mandates to elected officials. They act as a means for promoting public accountability, and improve the legitimacy of political institutions. Thus, it makes sense that elections can at some point act in a positive way within a post-conflict democracy. This is consistent with the conceptual definitions of democracy used by (Schumpeter 1947, 269) and (Huntington 1993, 6). In both works, democracy is defined as, "...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." It is clear, that even in a minimalist sense, elections matter in a democracy. Beyond a foundational framework, can they serve a larger more direct purpose?

   Elections can be useful during the fragile implementation of a peace agreement. First, they can act as a stabilizing agent within the settlement process. Second, they are capable of outlining a particular distribution of power, or third, reveal information about social support for the contending parties that might change this distribution of power (Matanock 2012). Lastly, elections are capable of focusing political interest on the rules that regulate violations within a power sharing agreement (Przeworski 1991, Weingast 1997, Fearon 2011).

   Elections provide voters credible information on political parties participating in the electoral process, (Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007, Blaydes 2010) as well as increase perceived legitimacy of state actions, especially when both parties respect electoral results (Schedler 2006).[5] The characterization of elections as competitive implies that elections are used as legitimate means to obtain power. It therefore seems possible for elections, (through a third party observer) to provide pathways to the resolution of conflict through a legitimate and non-violent political framework. Elections then become a cheaper and more effective mechanism of achieving political ends than conflict. Electoral engineering in this regard, (for example through the use of quotas) is able to institutionalize the distribution of

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[5.] When one party, particularly the rebel group, does not respect electoral results there is strong evidence of violent protest and riots (Hyde 2014, Kricheli 2011).

power expected from conflict.[6]

Indeed, when the distribution of power or resources gained from democratic competition is equal to or greater than those gained from violence, parties to an intrastate conflict commit to peace (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, Matanock 2012).[7]Thus, there exists a bargaining range in which both sides are capable of and willing to peacefully resolve a conflict (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, Matanock 2012).[8] From this perspective, as (Fearon 1995) argues, rational actors should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of a costly conflict. Unless states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, then conflict is inefficient ex post.

Nevertheless, the resolution of conflict is still problematic. Developing democracies, whether struggling with the consequences of violence or not, lack the consecutive elections necessary to establish strong inter-party competition. It is still necessary for there to be an institutional framework in place for elections to have a positive effect, otherwise rebel groups are likely to slip back into violence (Brancati and Snyder 2011, 2012). As Flores and Norrudin (2012) show, a state with a history of democracy is less likely to experience conflict post-transition than a state that is newly democratized. Likewise, (Cheibub and Hayes 2010) show that conflict is more likely when a state lacks a minimal framework for democratic institutions. The third party can be useful in this regard, creating a transparent process similar to what Przeworski (1991) describes as necessary.

4. The Role of Third Party Actors

In established democracies there are mechanisms in place to guarantee the efficient and transparent occurrence of elections (Przeworski 1991, Weingast 1997, Fearon 2011). Even if dissatisfaction with elections in these democracies results in political protest, the mechanisms in place do not fail, and there is little organized violence (Hyde 2014). However, post-conflict societies are often semi-democratic at best and lack the internal mechanisms to guarantee compliance with the rules and regulations that dictate elections. Third parties are capable of providing external mechanisms for this to take place. There are several reasons why this would occur.

International interest in intrastate conflicts has grown dramatically during the post-Cold War era. It is shown that in the post-Cold War era, domestic conflict occurs more frequently and lasts longer than conflict between states (Walter 1997, Fearon 2003, Collier 2004b). Equally important, intrastate war often occurs alongside - or even causes - interstate war (Chiozza 2004, Gleditsch 2008). This has led both international organizations and world powers to increasingly view domestic conflicts as a greater security threat than conflict between states (Dobbins 2003, 2008).

[6.] Other literature on post-conflict elections suggests that such engineered electoral systems may be useful for security reasons, (Wantchekon 2004, Hartzell 2015) and that degrees of liberal democracy can occur from these elections (Paris 2004, Roeder 2005, Manning 2008, Reilly 2006, Matanock 2012, 12).

[7.] The payoffs received through a structured peace settlement must be relative to their respective strength, largely dependent upon their expectations (Cox North &Weingast 2013).

[8.] For example Angola in 1991.

Because civil war undoubtedly has a robust connection to weak or failed states, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the international community renewed their interests in helping to support failing states (Krasner 2004). Furthermore, it seems that the severity of the domestic conflict is what drives the international community to involve themselves in peacekeeping ventures (Fortna 2004, Fortna 2008). Such involvement is more likely to be motivated by normative reasons, as opposed to legitimate security threats (Finnemore 1996, Finnemore 2004, Matanock 2012).[9] Both perspectives successfully predict the growing interest that international actors have in the domestic affairs of conflict-prone states.

Despite the continued interest in international intervention in domestic conflict, putting boots onto the ground in a sovereign state is not easy. Such engagements are expensive and not always sufficiently beneficial to a single state to encourage it to bear the costs of intervening. The human cost during the 1993 intervention in Somalia, for example, makes even willing actors less open to the idea of committing troops to end an intrastate conflict (Dobbins 2003). Nevertheless, recent empirical work by Findley (2015) suggests that for democratic third parties, the benefits of intervention in intrastate conflict often outweigh the costs.

Putting aside the role of military intervention, democratic third parties, including both the United States and the UN, have largely assumed the responsibility for overseeing and enforcing peace agreements. There are several reasons why this would occur. Election monitoring for example, is a cheaper mechanism for obtaining peace than intervention. There are less human and financial costs, and therefore less disapproval of intervention by domestic constituents. Also, the symbolic presence of a third party - as election observers for example - can have the same effect as the use of weapons.[10]

The use of election monitoring has become a pervasive mechanism for both conflict resolution and democracy promotion across different regime types. Third parties observed approximately 80 percent of the world's elections in 2004 (Kelley 2008, Hyde 2011). In fact often times it is the opposition party, including former rebel groups, that demand election observers Carothers 2011, Bjornlund 2004). During these elections, third parties monitor both the electoral process, as well as the state's overall commitment to democracy, including their dedication to the protection of human rights and developing rule of law (Hyde 2007, Kelley 2008). Election monitoring also allows third parties to punish violations of peace agreements, even long after a civil war has ended.

Election monitoring by third parties allows for the international community to easily observe peace settlements, and punish those that do not adhere to the provisions of the agreement. For example, through the UN electoral assistance fund, the use of election-related aid as an incentive for compliance with peace agreements has risen dramatically

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[9.] There are instances where state intervention is clearly motivated by normative opposed to strategic reasons. Intervention in Cambodia at the end of the Cold War for example, clearly had no significant security interest for anyone but China. US intervention was a result of a moral opposition to the Khmer Rouge (Finnemore 1996).

[10.] For a better overview of this literature see Fortna (2004, 2008).

since the early 1990s (Farer 2004, Driscoll 2009).[11] A third party can withhold electoral aid until a party commits to provisions of the agreement. In this instance, aid is effectively used as a carrot or a stick to incentivize former combatants after the conflict has ended (Soderberg 2007). Nonetheless, there are cases where post-conflict elections are unsuccessful, despite monitoring, and peace agreements fail. There are several reasons why this is so.

Despite the increased interest of the international community in peace settlements, the willingness of the state actors to potentially oversee and punish other states is likely not consistent. States form strategic alliances and economic relationships with one another, which may influence their ability to potentially sanction in a manner that is necessary for elections to be useful. Variation in this ability may explain why, even after the Cold War, (and the international system has considerably shifted) electoral participation is absent from some negotiated settlements. Or even why some settlements fail due to the lack of credibility of the third party (Matanock 2012).

Furthermore, it is easy to consider possible scenarios where it is not necessary that a third party be present for a peace settlement to succeed. For example, if rebel governance at the sub-national level is sufficient enough, that transition to a legitimate political party at the national level is relatively easy. Or if civilian support for rebel leadership is sufficient that mobilization when transitioning to a political party is relatively easy. Despite this, there is significant variation in the extent of rebel governance, and it is clear that third parties are capable (at times necessary) in enforcing a peace agreement, if they choose to do so (Mampilly 2011, Matanock 2012).

5. The Cost of Violating Peace Agreements

The costs (and incentives) of violating or not violating the peace agreement are significant, in large part due to both parties being embedded in a transparent institutional framework of rules and deadlines governing the peace agreement. When these rules and regulations are violated, the international organization sanctions the violating party, for example, by public shaming, loss of domestic or international political support, or loss of resources (Fortna 2008, Matanock 2012). The public nature of such a process automatically sets up facilitation of the peace agreement.

The establishment of transparent rules and deadlines creates an understanding of what is expected of both parties leading up to elections, creating conditions for which leaders are held accountable. As each leader becomes visible through the process, they become responsible for both positive and negative aspects of their party. In this context, electoral politics allows for the rewarding and punishment of public leadership. If they act in a manner according to the peace agreement, the population rewards them with credibility. If they violate established rules, their constituents also hold them accountable. Similar to elections without a militant group for example, if a representative loses or abuses constituent resources, they and likely the party subsequently lose power. Participation within the electoral process by numerous actors reinforces the reward and punishment

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[11.] See Georgia and Tajikistan for examples.

structures.

Incentives and punishment for political leadership also exists from outside actors as well. International organizations are capable of rewarding or punishing political leadership through the distribution, or withholding, of aid.[12] Assuming leaders wants to receive as many resources as possible, the incentives to commit to the peace process is greater than the punishment leaders would receive if the agreement were violated. Therefore, a public framework within a peace agreement that clearly explains the conditions for compliance ideally should make noncompliance on the part of party leadership a moderately rare event.

Meanwhile deadlines allow for a temporal framework to develop stability throughout an otherwise volatile peace process. The setting of election deadlines allows for visible confirmation by both parties of progress made within both the electoral process and the peace agreement. For example, a clearly defined reduction of armed personnel either by the state or by the rebel group on a pre-determined date on the electoral calendar. Electoral rules and deadlines determine clear standards and thresholds for which actors on both sides can measure success or failure, making democratic elections a viable mechanism for reducing conflict.

As an extension of the theory, there are two testable hypotheses in this paper. The first tests the underlying assumptions of the theory. That when third parties are involved in peace agreements, it is possible for elections to be used as a mechanism to create a framework in which parties do not defect from the peace process. The second hypothesis tests the logic that elections can have a positive effect on post-conflict societies. Through competitive elections, legitimate political parties obtain resources more effectively than through conflict. Third parties can institutionalize a framework that allows for such competition.

H1: Elections, when part of a peace agreement and enforced by a third party, are more likely to decrease conflict.

H2: Party competition through post-conflict elections is more likely to decrease conflict.

6. Research Design

The theory is tested using 115 cases of civil war from 1940 to 2014. The dataset includes cases before and after the Cold War avoids any ideological bias. Likewise, it includes cases before and after Huntington's (1993) Third Wave avoids selecting cases based upon instances of democratization during the early 1990s. Finally, to avoid selecting on the dependent variable, it includes cases where a civil war has yet to be resolved, where a civil war did not end with a peace agreement, and where peace agreements did not include

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[12.] An example of this is the armed wing of the Progressive Unionist Party, the Ulster Volunteer Force, (UVF) in which it failed to comply with terms of the peace agreement, losing much of its campaign funding.

provisions for elections.[13]

Civil War is defined according to Sambanis (2004, 831).[14] As an armed conflict that (a) takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater; (b) the parties are politically and militarily organized, and they have publicly stated political objectives; (c) the government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant; (d) the main insurgent organization(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally; and (e) the start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500–1,000 deaths.[15] (f) Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level. There should be no three-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths. (g) Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance. Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party; (h) a peace treaty that produces at least six months of peace marks an end to the war.[16] (i) A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime should mark the end of the war. Because civil war is understood as an armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war.[17] (j) A ceasefire, truce, or simply an end to fighting can also mark the end of a civil war if they result in at least two years of peace.[18]

7. Variables and Methods

This paper uses duration of peace until a return to conflict as the dependent variable, measured in post-conflict country-years. Data is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset. In order to account for a return to fighting, I measure whether conflict between the rebel group and the state emerges within each year after the peace agreement. Important to note, a group could splinter and continue fighting, or an entirely new rebel group could emerge during the settlement. While the UCDP dataset accounts for this, it does not significantly affect the dataset. Of the 115 instances of civil war, there are 51 peace

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[13.] The full list of cases is found in the appendices. There are several cases that have been rejected due to low, or uncertain death count, including Oman, Cyprus, Thailand, and Angola - Cabinia. C.A.R., (1945–1999) Pakistan, (1994–1999) and Iraq (2003–) are viewed as sectarian conflicts.

[14.] This is also partially consistent with the definition used by Walter (2002).

[15.] Some might argue that a threshold of twenty-five deaths would be appropriate. However, this risks including cases of violence that are conceptually different than civil war. Moreover, the emphasis is on the end of large-scale intrastate violence, thus a higher death count is required.

[16.] This is amended to five years. Less than five years is considered a failed agreement.

[17.] See the 1992–1996 Afghan civil war for example. Even though fighting continued, the Taliban took control of the majority of the country, including three of the four major cities, and all major government institutions. As Sambanis (2004, 830) points out, ``this criterion allows researchers to study the stability of military victories. Analysis of the stability of civil war outcomes would be biased if we coded an end to civil war through military victory only when the victory was followed by a prolonged period of peace. This would bias the results in favor of finding a positive correlation between military outcomes and peace duration.''

[18.] This is considered the end of a civil war, but not a successful peace agreement. A peace agreement is considered successful if there is not a return to conflict within a five-year period.

agreements. In 24 instances, the peace agreement failed, and there was a return to conflict.[19]

There are two independent variables used to test the theoretical model. The primary independent variable is a measure of electoral participation. I classify three categories of settlements: peace settlement with electoral participation by warring parties, peaceful settlement without participation, and no settlement. The primary explanatory variables are dichotomous indicators capturing the first two of these categories, leaving no settlement as the reference category.[20] However, electoral participation can be difficult to account for in such instances.

For electoral participation to take place, there are several requirements. There must be provisions in the peace agreement for post-conflict elections to take place. In these situations, the agreement establishes a timetable for elections. The settlement must legitimize the rebel group as a political party, or a transitional government must be created, and the rebel group included as a political party. This was accounted for using the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset. Likewise, the rebel group must be willing to disarm, and compete in these elections, and all parties involved are expected to field candidates (Matanock 2012).

The secondary variable is when elections do occur: whether political parties were competitive.[21] The measure is a binary variable, with 1 equaling the presence of party competition, and 0 equally no party competition. While a peace settlement is more than a power-sharing agreement, if a rebel groups turned political party is compelled to accept the distribution of power derived from an electoral process, they are less likely to return to violence. In addition to these two independent variables there are also several control variables in each model.

Because the sequencing of elections is said to influence a return to conflict, I control for the timing of elections (Brancati and Snyder 2012).[22] I control for population in a country, and for economic growth, defined as a change in GDP per capita.[23] Because ethnic grievances are considered part of conflict, I control for the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country. Because Collier and Hoeffler (2004a) find that significant oil exports has a negative correlation with conflict, I control for oil exportation. Because anocracies are less effective at resolving conflicts than democracies, I control for the level of democracy using Polity IV data (Fearon 2003). I control for third party enforcement of agreements.[24] Finally I control for the duration of the civil war and the presence of a peacekeeping force.[25]

[19.] This only includes full peace agreements, and excludes partial ones.

[20.] Data for this variable is taken from both the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and newspaper sources that covered post-conflict elections.

[21.] Taken from Vanhanen's (2000) Index of Democracy. This was also checked against the reporting of electoral results in media outlets.

[22.] This is taken from Binghamton's Institutions and Elections dataset. According to the IAEP codebook, their electtime variable is coded as the following: 1 = no formal schedule and elections are at the will and timing of an executive (No formal schedule). 2 = formally scheduled elections at fixed intervals (exact periods). 3 = formal mechanisms for scheduling within a fixed interval, but the timing is determined by extant political processes (inexact periods).

[23.] I take the log of both variables. Data for the population variable is taken from the World Bank, and data for economic growth is taken from the Angus Maddison data project.

[24.] Taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

[25.] The duration of the civil war is measured in years. The peacekeeping variable is taken from the UCDP dataset.

Missing data is coded as the mean of that conflict. These variables are lagged accordingly one year.

Using event history modeling with a Weibull distribution, I estimate one model for each independent variable. I also include a frailty term to account for misspecification and a monotonic rate of failure. While a Cox model is generally considered the superior model in this case, a Weibull model is used to take into account out of sample predictions.[26] To account for the fit of the Weibull model, I perform a Wald Test. I also test the proportional hazard assumption of a Cox model. Finally, to discern which model is more appropriate, I compare the AIC of both models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 43). Tests indicate that while the Wald Test is significant, and the proportional hazard assumption holds, the Weibull models have a lower AIC than either of the Cox models. This makes the Weibull model a better choice (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).[27] The Cox model estimates along with Probit models are used as robustness checks and found in the appendices. They generally support the results of the Weibull models in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Survival Model 1

	Hazard Ratio	**Std. Error**
Peace Settlement without Electoral Participation	−18.111**	(3.056)
Peace Settlement with Electoral Participation	−28.185**	(4.263)
Timing of Elections	−0.397	(0.331)
Third Party Enforcement	−1.777*	(0.860)
Peacekeeping Force	3.350**	(0.730)
Population (log)	1.215**	(0.317)
Economic Growth (log)	1.391*	(0.615)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.983*	(0.987)
Oil Exportation	−0.099	(0.581)
Democracy	−0.078*	(0.039)
Civil War Duration	−0.031	(0.029)
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−58.865	
Time at Risk	686.25	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	117.931	

Significance levels : †: 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

[26.] Important to note when using a Weibull model, if the underlying assumptions concerning the shape of the hazard function are incorrect, the results will be invalid. Although, when assumptions are met, a Weibull model offers more precise estimates of survival than a Cox model.

[27.] The AIC for Weibull models 1 and 2, and Cox models 1 and 2, were 141.45 and 154.32 and 325.32 and 321.57, respectively.

Table 2: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Survival Model 2

	Hazard Ratio	Std. Error
Party Competition	−16.304**	(2.392)
Timing of Elections	−0.497	(0.327)
Third Party Enforcement	−1.17	(0.917)
Peacekeeping Force	1.990*	(0.986)
Population (log)	1.151**	(0.296)
Economic Growth (log)	1.855**	(0.630)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.296*	(1.028)
Oil Exportation	−0.264	(0.584)
Democracy	−0.008	(0.042)
Civil War Duration	−0.123**	(0.040)
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−66.159	
Time at Risk	1481.25	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	230.735	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

8. Analysis

The results of the models reported in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the utility of an event history model. In addition, the results of this paper support the general idea that strong democratic institutions - transparent and institutionalized electoral and party systems - are a critical part of the peace process. In looking at Table 1, peace agreements without provisions for elections are negative and statistically significant. However, when electoral participation is part of an agreement, there is a greater and equally significant effect. This indicates that while peace agreements alone are obviously an important part of resolving conflict, those agreements that contain provisions for electoral participation by both warring parties are more likely to ensure peace over a long period of time.

This is further supported by figure one, in which the survival of peace agreements with, (and without) electoral participation is plotted over time. It shows that peace agreements without conditions for elections eventually fail and you see a return to conflict. However, those peace agreements that require participation as a requirement for settlement, and are overseen by a third party, do not fail. Broadly this supports the first hypothesis that elections, when a part of peace agreements that are mediated by a third party, are more likely to decrease conflict. It more specifically supports the model used in this paper, in which third parties can use elections to incentivize warring parties not to defect from a peace agreement.

In Table 2, you see a negative and statistically significant effect of party competition on a return to conflict. While the effect is less pronounced and not as statistically significant as the previous independent variable, this implies that party competition increases the time until a return to conflict. Meaning that when post-conflict elections exhibit party competition, states are more likely to enjoy peace. It further supports the second hypothesis that competitive political parties can decrease the risk of a return to fighting. The dynamics of party competition in conflict-prone societies is shown in figure two.

**Figure 1:** Elections as part of peace agreements

Figure 2: Survival of party competition after civil war

Moreover, figure two shows peace lasts longer in states where competition between political parties is more common. Conversely, those states where post-conflict elections cannot be characterized as competitive are more likely to experience violence. This

supports much of the comparative politics literature that argues democratic institutions are part and parcel to a healthy and peaceful society (Przeworski 1991, Fearon 2011). It also supports the underlying logic of the theoretical framework. That when the distribution of resources gained from democratic competition is equal to, or greater than resources gained from violence, parties use elections as a legitimate mechanism to resolve conflict (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, Matanock 2012). Thus, peace agreements between warring parties should continue after a third party leaves.

The benefit of using a Weibull model is the ability to make out of sample predictions. In looking at figure 3, it seems that when a peace agreement without elections occurs, it eventually declines approximately a year and a half later. Whereas when peace agreements with provisions for electoral participation occur, they do not decline within five years after a peace agreement. In looking at figure 4, it seems that once parties get past the first election, there is less likelihood of a return to conflict. This supports Fearon's (2011) work that democracy is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Likewise that elections and parties can serve a larger purpose in post-conflict scenarios.

The performance of the other variables gives further insight into the peace process. In both models, the timing of elections is both negative, although not statistically significant in either model. On the surface, this suggests that the timing of elections is important to the peace process. Overall, these results are consistent with Brancati and Snyder (2011, 2012). Specifically, that elections do not have a positive effect until demobilization and democratization subsequently occurs. Thus, even though elections are an important mechanism for a peace process, a minimal framework for democratic competition is required. This is likewise supportive of previous theoretical work.

In looking at the effect of third party enforcement, the results are negative and statistically significant in the first model, and negative in the second. This suggests that using elections, third party enforcement of peace agreements can play an important role in reducing the likelihood of returning to fighting. This is largely reflective of the model used in this paper. Specifically, credible third party actors can shift the preferences of parties committed to an agreement. More generally, it supports the literature on third parties. These electoral observers can cheaply and effectively monitor post-conflict elections. In contrast with enforcement of the rules of peace settlements, peacekeeping has an opposite effect.

The presence of a peacekeeping force has a positive and statistically significant effect on a return to conflict in the first model, and is positive in the second. The implication of this is that peacekeeping troops actually increase the likelihood of conflict. This is reflective of the existing literature on the subject. This further implies that while third party enforcement of the provisions included within peace agreements has a positive effect on a peace process, third party *intervention*, boots on the ground so to speak, has a negative effect. Likewise that third party credibility does not come from intervention, but some other mechanism for enforcement of an agreement.[28]

[28.] However, because peacekeepers go to states where conflict is the worst, it makes sense that there might be a quicker return to conflict. Thus, more research is required.

Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940 - 2014
Out of Sample Predictions of Elections After Civil War

Figure 3: Out of sample predictions of elections after civil war

Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940 - 2014
Out of Sample Predictions of Party Competition After Civil War

Figure 4: Out of sample predictions of party competition after civil war

Population has a positive and statistically significant effect on a return to conflict in both models. This suggests that an increasing population is more likely to decrease the time until a return to conflict. Thus, states with larger populations are more likely to see a peace agreement fail. Meanwhile, economic growth is positive, statistically insignificant effect in the first model, and negative and statistically insignificant in the second. Which suggests that wealthier countries have a harder time successfully implementing a peace settlement. But once democratic competition is institutionalized, wealthier countries are less likely to see conflict.

Ethnic fractionalization is positive in both models, and statistically significant in the first. Which suggests that a fractionalized society is more likely to see a return to conflict. Oil exportation is negative in both models. While not statistically significant, this implies, that an oil exporting country is more likely to see continued fighting. Both of which are consistent with the literature. Democracy and the duration of civil war are both negative. This implies that democracy improves the likelihood of peace. Also that once shorter conflicts end, they are less likely to return to violence than conflicts that last longer. Both of these findings seem relatively intuitive. However, both have only a marginal effect, and are only significant in one model each.

9. Conclusion

An event history model offers considerable leverage in understanding the dynamic qualities of civil war peace agreements, particularly the influence of outside parties. At the same time, this method of analysis illustrates the shortcomings of contemporary theoretical explanations and empirical investigations of peace agreements. Specifically regarding those claims as to how and why civil wars evolve into different outcomes. The analysis finds for example, that the role of third party enforcement is statistically significant in one model, but not the other. The inconclusiveness of this finding indicates the quality of data used, but also the accuracy of theoretical explanations. Therefore, while a survival model is better than alternative methods, it is not perfect.

Not all agreements are equally effective, however much of the theory and subsequent empirical model assumes that a credible third party enforces violations of the peace agreement. Likewise, the empirical model does not take into account variation in third party commitment. It is more than likely that varying third party commitment would change the results. The limitations of both the theory and statistical models further highlights the varying outcomes of civil wars, and the importance of viewing peace agreements as dynamic processes, opposed to static ones.

Ultimately, these results should be of considerable interest to conflict scholars. They should allow for the emergence of better theoretical explanations, and more precise empirical investigations of both the electoral process as part of peace agreements, and the role of third parties in overseeing them. This paper further brings together literature on elections, democratization, conflict and peace-building. It also offers those academics interested in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, an open avenue of research that was otherwise closed.

To policymakers, the results offer an effective tool to better design and implement successful peace agreements. With respect to the policy realm, had interested outside parties not been committed to ending the Salvadoran civil war, and likewise if they had not been seen as credible in enforcing terms of the agreement, El Salvador would have likely slid backwards into conflict. Conversely, if Liberia had seen credible third parties oversee elections in 1997, there would have likely been a higher probability of reaching a successful settlement, instead of a return to conflict. Ultimately, the related theory and statistical models above, suggest conditions exist when elections can prove useful to peace.

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APPENDIX

Table 3: Civil Wars Between 1940 and 2014

Civil War	Duration	Negotiation	Bargain	Outcome
Afghanistan	1978–1992	Yes	No	Unsuccessful Settlement
Afghanistan	1992–1996	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Afghanistan	1996–2001	No	No	Decisive Victory
Algeria	1962–1963	No	No	Decisive Victory
Algeria[4]	1992–2005	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Angola	1975–1991	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Angola	1992–1994	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Angola	1997-2002	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Argentina	1955	No	No	Decisive Victory
Azerbaijan	1991–	Yes	No	Unresolved
Bangladesh	1974–1997	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Bolivia	1952	No	No	Decisive Victory
Bosnia	1992–1995	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Burma	1948–1951	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burma	1948–1988	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burma	1960–1995	Yes	Yes	Decisive Victory
Burma	1968–1980	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burma	1983-	No	No	Unresolved
Burundi	1965–1969	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burundi	1972	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burundi	1988	No	No	Decisive Victory
Burundi	1991–2005	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Cambodia	1970–1975	No	No	Decisive Victory
Cambodia	1979–1991	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Chad	1965–1979	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Chad	1980–1994	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Chad	1994–1997	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
China	1946–1949	Yes	Yes	Decisive Victory
China	1947	No	No	Decisive Victory
China	1956–1959	No	No	Decisive Victory
China	1967-1968	No	No	Decisive Victory
Colombia	1948–1962	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Colombia	1984-	Yes	No	Unresolved
Congo–Brazzaville	1993–1997	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Costa Rica	1948	No	No	Decisive Victory
Croatia	1991–1992	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Cuba	1958–1959	No	No	Decisive Victory
Djibouti	1991–1994	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Dom. Republic	1965	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
El Salvador	1979–1992	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Ethiopia	1974–1991	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Ethiopia	1976–1988	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement

Civil War	Duration	Negotiation	Bargain	Outcome
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1991–1994	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Georgia (S. Ossetia)	1991–1992	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Greece	1944–1949	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Guatemala	1954	No	No	Decisive Victory
Guatemala*B*	1966–1996	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Guinea-Bissau	1998–1999	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Haiti	1991–1995	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
India	1984–1993	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
India	1989-	Yes	Yes	Unresolved
India	1990-	Yes	No	Unresolved
Indonesia	1950	No	No	Decisive Victory
Indonesia	1953	No	No	Decisive Victory
Indonesia	1956–1960	No	No	Decisive Victory
Indonesia	1975–1999	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Iran	1979–1984	No	No	Decisive Victory
Iran	1978–1979	No	No	Decisive Victory
Iraq	1959	No	No	Decisive Victory
Iraq	1961–1970	No	No	Decisive Victory
Iraq	1974–1975	No	No	Decisive Victory
Iraq	1985–1996	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Iraq	1991–1993	No	No	Decisive Victory
Jordan	1970–1971	No	No	Decisive Victory
Laos	1960–1973	Yes	Yes	Decisive Victory
Lebanon	1958	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Lebanon	1975–1991	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Liberia	1989–1997	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Mali	1990–1995	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Moldova	1991–1992	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Mozambique	1976–1992	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Namibia	1973–1999	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Nicaragua	1978–1979	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Nicaragua	1982–1990	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Nigeria	1967-1970	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Nigeria	1980–1985	No	No	Decisive Victory
Northern Ireland	1971–1998	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Pakistan	1971	No	No	Decisive Victory
Pakistan	1973–1977	No	No	Decisive Victory
Papua New Guinea	1988–1998	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Paraguay	1947	No	No	Decisive Victory
Peru	1980–1996	No	No	Decisive Victory
Philippines	1950–1952	No	No	Decisive Victory
Philippines	1971–2014	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Philippines	1972–1992	No	No	Decisive Victory
Romania	1989	No	No	Decisive Victory
Rwanda	1963–1964	No	No	Decisive Victory
Rwanda	1990–1994	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement

(Continued)

Civil War	Duration	Negotiation	Bargain	Outcome
Russia	1994–1996	No	No	Decisive Victory
Senegal	1989–1999	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Sierra Leone	1991–1996	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Sierra Leone	1997–2001	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
South Africa	1976–1994	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
South Yemen	1986	No	No	Decisive Victory
Somalia	1988–1991	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Somalia	1991–	Yes	Yes	Unresolved
Sri Lanka	1971	No	No	Decisive Victory
Sri Lanka[C]	1983–2009	Yes	Yes	Decisive Victory
Sudan	1963–1972	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Sudan	1983–2002	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Tajikistan	1992–1994	Yes	No	Unsuccessful Settlement
Turkey	1984–1999	Yes	No	Decisive Victory
Uganda	1966	No	No	Decisive Victory
Uganda	1978–1979	No	No	Decisive Victory
Uganda	1980–1988	Yes	Yes	Decisive Victory
Uganda	1981–1987	No	No	Decisive Victory
Uganda	1990–1992	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Uganda	1995–	Yes	Yes	Unsuccessful Settlement
Vietnam	1960–1965	No	No	Decisive Victory
Yemen	1948	No	No	Decisive Victory
Yemen	1962–1969	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Yemen	2004–2014	No	No	Decisive Victory
Zimbabwe	1972–1979	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement
Zimbabwe	1983–1987	Yes	Yes	Successful Settlement

[A.] Algeria (1992–2005) is coded differently from Sambanis, (2004) due to demobilization and a peace initiative in 2005

[B.] Guatemala (1966–1996) is coded as a single war, whereas Sambanis (2004) codes it as two separate ones.

[C.] Sri Lanka (1883–2009) is coded as ending in 2009, due to the military defeat of the LTTE.

As a robustness check this paper uses both a Cox Model and a Probit model for each independent variable. The results found on the following pages, while not all statistically significant, are comparable to the primary models in the paper. In looking at Table 4, elections have a negative effect on the return to conflict. This further supports the first hypothesis that elections, when a part of peace agreements that are mediated by a third party, are more likely to decrease conflict. In Table 5, you see a negative and significant effect of party competition on a return to conflict. This again, implies that party competition increases the time until a return to conflict, making failure of peace agreements less likely.

In the Cox models the performance of the other variables supports much of the previous two models. While only statistically significant in the second model, in both models the timing of elections is negative. In looking at the effect of third party enforcement, the results are statistically significant in both models, but positive in the first and negative in the second. Third party enforcement causes the time to a return to conflict to increase in the first and decrease in the second. The presence of a peacekeeping force is likewise opposite, and thus more research is required.

Population has a positive effect on a return to conflict in the first and second models. Meanwhile, economic growth has a positive effect in the first model, and has a negative effect in the second. Which is dissimilar from the previous models. The rest of the models are predominantly similar to the previous models in both effect and significance.

The probit models (see Tables 6 and 7) also support the primary results. They increase the likelihood of a return to conflict. While it is not statistically significant, those agreements that require elections do not. Party competition likewise decreases the likelihood of a return to conflict. In looking at the other variables, the results are approximately the same. This is with the notable exception of third party enforcement of an agreement. In both Probit models, third party enforcement increases the likelihood of violence.

Table 4: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Cox Model 1

	Hazard Ratio	Std. Error
Peace Settlement without Electoral Participation	0.305	(1.403)
Peace Settlement with Electoral Participation	−0.046	(0.691)
Timing of Elections	−0.428	(0.292)
Third Party enforcement	−1.813*	(0.797)
Peacekeeping Force	1.922**	(0.661)
Population (log)	0.225	(0.320)
Economic Growth (log)	1.139	(0.778)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.867*	(0.940)
Oil Exportation	0.925	(0.578)
Democracy	0.018	(0.042)
Civil War Duration	0.012	(0.030)
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−150.659	
Time at Risk	686.00	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	31.163	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Cox Model 2

	Hazard Ratio	Std. Error
Party Competition	−1.676**	(0.599)
Timing of Elections	−0.739**	(0.285)
Third Party Enforcement	−1.807†	(0.958)
Peacekeeping Force	1.526	(0.998)
Population (log)	0.204	(0.309)
Economic Growth (log)	−0.773	(0.775)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.328	(0.900)
Oil Exportation	0.767	(0.558)
Democracy	0.069	(0.047)
Civil War Duration	−0.087*	(0.042)

	Hazard Ratio	Std. Error
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−149.784	
Time at Risk	1480.00	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	42.561	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Probit Model 1

	Coefficient	Std. Error
Peace Settlement without Electoral Participation	1.240**	(0.389)
Peace Settlement with Electoral Participation	−0.051	(0.297)
Timing of Elections	−0.134	(0.136)
Third Party enforcement	0.877**	(0.209)
Peacekeeping Force	0.090	(0.293)
Population (log)	0.030	(0.150)
Economic Growth (log)	−0.528	(0.336)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.785*	(0.384)
Oil Exportation	0.222	(0.264)
Democracy	0.004	(0.020)
Civil War Duration	0.001	(0.013)
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−103.39	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	43.338	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7: Elections and Civil War Peace Settlements 1940–2014, Probit Model 2

	Coefficient	Std. Error
Party Competition	−0.349	(0.257)
Timing of Elections	−0.139	(0.134)
Third Party Enforcement	0.791†	(0.202)
Peacekeeping Force	0.152	(0.286)
Population (log)	0.060	(0.147)
Economic Growth (log)	−0.342	(0.350)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.651†	(0.369)
Oil Exportation	0.236	(0.267)
Democracy	0.017	(0.021)
Civil War Duration	−0.001	(0.012)
N	1612	
Log-likelihood	−106.202	
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	37.212	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.