

POLICIES FOR FOOD SECURITY IN INDIA – A CRITICAL REVIEW

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The debate on food replace cash transfer is a more critical subject in India. The present review based study discusses the arguments related food policy in India and other developing countries. The main objective of the critical review paper is to discuss what have done and what need to be done in food policy of India. This review based critical research is divided into two major parts: one is food transfer, and second is direct benefit (cash) transfer. The methodology point of view, this study is collected and discussed mainly on critical policy oriented and empirical research papers. These debates are essential to measure with help of micro-economics theory and subject of development concepts. The argument of food transfer is to the advice in connected leakages, error terms and more diversions but in other hand improved and successful role model of food transfer is in different states in India. The direct benefit (cash) transfer strongly suggests that diverse customer choices improve lifestyle, and provide benefits, health and nutrition of poor households. All the transfers are covered by conditional cash transfer in India and international experiences. Finally, food replacement with direct cash transfer is also critically evaluated. This paper examines ways and means by which food transfer and direct benefit (cash) transfer able to be constructing, and the problem they raise. Its something a specified location of the interpretation for the review analysis speaks about the topic. It is possibly fit and helpful to find by the clarity of ideas, which should be assisted in the economic and social policies in India.

Key words: Food, cash, micro-economics, benefits, preferences and challenges.

JEL Classification: Q18

1. Food Policy in India

Food is the basic need of humanity. Non-availability of food and its shortage is a global phenomenon affecting the multitude of poor and vulnerable. Natural calamities and disasters like famines exacerbate the problem. The famine times in India, on examples of such famines, which were caused by sudden and sharp decline in food availability and affected the entitlements of the poor (Sen, 1981). The occasional famines occurred in India with some regularity. There were about 14 famines between eleventh and seventeenth centuries, but they were primarily localised. It was only after 1860 that famines came

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to signify a general shortage of food grains. There occurred twenty famines in the two decades between 1880 -1909 (Bhatia, 1970). Till the 1960s, this was also the case in India.

Indian agriculture was not able to meet domestic requirements, and the country had to depend on food grain imports. Realizing the disastrous consequences of the growing population and decline in food production, a vigorous Grow More Food Campaign (GMFC) was launched. The vital role of economic planning was to realize the self-sufficiency in food grains (Bhatia, 1985). This food policy was seen in the government launching, Intensive Agriculture District Programme (IADP), in 1959 with inputs of experts from the Ford Foundation, USA. Its purpose was to design the course of action to be taken for improving the productivity of agriculture. It paved the way for the Green Revolution. The programme was launched in seven states, four of which were rice-producing, two wheat-producing states and one millet-producing state. It was a great success and created new dynamism in the country's efforts to achieve food grains at independent (Rao, 1964). In the 1960s, it showed the growth of agricultural food cultivation in India. Still, it resulted in the growth of agricultural production. The main task of the policy was to plan a suitable strategy to concurrently connect food production with the macro environment by concluding the hole connecting small and long-run impacts through job creation and rural development strategies. Having a food production policy supported with effective use of food price policy would be ideal to target food subsidies fully. However, nations have only boundless knowledge in organization a food policy that is reliable and planned to integrate. There is no nation, which has a way of jointly parts, mainly mixed policy of food and price policy have not appreciated, and a reasonable price policy also has not solved the production troubles. The price of incentive worsens the consumer utilisation. Still, a grip of confident and bad ideas of food and price policy in such nations, it is an important subject of the policy debate on food security in developing countries (Timmer, 1983).

India is the highest supply of food on the earth. It has a complex food insecurity problem. The Economic Survey data illustrates that the North and Northwest of India produce 40 per cent of total food grain production. The inequality of output is higher than it was in the seventies when the total share of states was around 30 per cent (Patnaik, 2001). In the 1960s, while considering the different state in India, it has pushed into cash crop like spices, rubber and tea. Because of agriculture and local push that will create equal rights of food production (Alexandrators, 2012). Besides, a bureaucracy that is not connected to the masses and the problem of corruption that plagues India's public service delivery system that has also not spared this sector. Food supply system through the Public Distribution System (PDS) is not immune to these problems either. The nature of food insecurity has been posited well (Patnaik, 2004). The problem of food insecurity is aggravated as there is a reduction in state intervention of PDS, food for work and other welfare linked programmes, and direct aid coupled with a rapid opening-up of the agricultural sector to foreign competition. This has given rise to rural poverty and lowered the food security of the poor. The collapse of rural livelihoods and incomes has coincided. The robust demand and distribution issues are the focal points of the problem of food security in India. An in-depth study of the previous literature pertaining to the present study helps as it enlightens on the subsets chosen. In India, the debate on food or cash transfers ideas is mostly emotional.

The main objective of the critical review paper is to discuss what have done and what need to be done in food policy of India. In a different way of talks and suggestions, this paper examines ways and means by which food transfer and direct benefit (cash) system related critical review based analysis. It will be helpful to assist the economic and social (food) policies in India. The methodology point of view, this review based study is collected and discussed mainly on critical policy oriented and empirical research papers.

2. Theory and Political Economy

The essentials of discussing microeconomic lean to draw from neoclassical theory (South Worth, 1945). In 1980s and 1990s, the cash transfer argues acknowledged with practical thought, counting cultivation of massive club of information on exploratory national experience of in-kind and international experience of cash transfers. Interestingly, experimental reliability in the literature appears into the attendance for cash benefit transfers mystery that rejects the neo-classical economist ideas, which are infra-marginal food and cash benefit has only theoretically accepted the result of food utilisation. Given an outline of in-kind food transfer is extra marginal (infra-marginal), and it affects with lack of households food consumption in short and long time (Gentilini, 2016).

Indeed, all works identify food stocks raise availability of home nutrient from 2 to 10 times the rate of a like value of the income income (Barrett, 2010). Income transfer debate is not new. Even in the seventieth century, England and the Edessa around 124 BC were found its accounts (Lindert,2005). In latest, 19th and 21st century, discussed cash benefit transfers in worldwide step to take the slice by crossing ocean routes, including the regional exchange of money items (Barreet&Maxwell, 2006). Since the mid-21stcentury, the increasing function of equipment to the release system has extra pushed notice on cash benefit transfers with an expert method on the money supply of support (Vincent and Cull, 2011). In worldwide, food supply system changed radically near to targeted method, new technology, regional purchased and plan for health and growth of noise items. Several sites remain insight about public distribution system that has totally scatter diagram (Gentilini, 2016). In part, the missed presentation of major countrywide public distribution system essentially served food grains are better quality. It is connected to politics measurement. Still now, ration products travel to long roadway with a truck to suffering zones (GoI, 2005). Further, food transfer possibly will be a moderate extent of extra openly connected to incapability nations; families find food, prefer to a group of people. As an alternative, benefits transfers tend to call up just the turnaround imagery of free will and self-sufficiency the same plan for the important role of In-kind transfers such as, for example, providing access to food (Gentilini, 2016). The later observations raise, on the other side, a regular point of food transfers which consider dependents essentially. For important point, influence favour of food transfers on facility of grains. It includes important debate around conditionality (Fiszberin&Schady, 2009). In an additional point of view, the requirement system corresponds to power behaviour of consumption. It has certain limits, policy and practice of health care, child care, and family members are misinformed about nutritional benefits (Das, 2005).

Below this argument, consumption pattern is shifted to the price of alternative preference, guiding to In-kind transfer system. In another side, the in-kind system is not allowed the maximum satisfaction of customer choice for its magic of cash advantages, including the cash system that helps to the stability of household power. The cash system may change the poverty status and, significantly, an equilibrium of rules, including a country and all the citizens to favour. The main argument of cash system offers different choices of customers, the power to all poor households, and building a new definition. If any type of cash system can be considered, the merits of the benefits are to the investigation, which completes the in-kind transfer system (Devarajan, 2013). Finally, Khera, 2013 points out that the stress of cash transfer system considers cash advantages and the policy and practice in the part of public authority of restricting in the freedom or otherwise their interest. The mainstream of debates goes to the political economy of choice of which transfers. On other side, what the public wants in favour of household choice.

3. Economics of Cash and Food Transfers

Two significant factors that predict relative effectiveness of cash and food transfers is the amount of the shifts relation to home utilization and recipients and insignificant predisposition to eat rations out of that transmit. In relation to conservative methods, an inframarginal food transfer and a cash transfer of equivalent worth would have the similar result in strengthening home food utilization and recipients' insignificant predisposition to eat food out of an extra revenue by means of an food or cash transfers should be the equivalent. If different, here is just an revenue outcome and no cost outcome connected with inframarginal transfers. If food transfers are extra marginal, and three fundamental circumstances are met, food utilization out of in-kind transfers would be larger more an equivalent cash transfer owing to the cost outcome. An empirical regularity is the refusal of the benchmark method's prophecy. In fact, this is extensively displayed that in-kind transfers lean to raise food utilization extra than money transfers while in-kind transfers are inframarginal. In contrast, the cash transfer riddle involves the insignificant predisposition to eat food out of an in-kind transfer, that is, more than that penniless transfer (Gentilini, 2014). The various descriptions have been suggested for distinction with no decisive responses. Feasible causes comprise a labelling result of in-kind transfers that encourage a notion of ethical requirement amongst beneficiaries to employ in-kind transfer for their proposed food consumption. In contrast, the subsistence of cash-puzzle is a usually recognized experimental statement, though an perceptive of the causes behind such a puzzle stays imperfect. Significantly, what is consigned to as in-kind as food transfer, the evidence discussed above, is drawn mainly from programmes in high-income contexts. Taking a clue from the above discussion, the subject for the next section is the nature and state of functions and the debate in India.

4. Evidence of Food Transfers in Developing Countries

The impact of many structural adjustments made on food subsidy and food security is evident and experienced in PDS of developing countries. During 1980-82, in the Mexico

Food System, the budgetary pressure affected changing the food policy by changing from universal to targeted systems. The targeted food stamps were introduced in 1986. The targeting system has to maintain some criteria. However, household income and household locations, the people are eligible for food stamps programmes. Because of the nation, it considers the nutrition support (Jonathan, 1992). In Sri Lanka, the universal food subsidy system was introduced in 1942. In 1978, the universal policy was changed to target only those with a monthly income of ₹300. Again, there was a shift from targeted to food stamps policy. These shifts negatively affected public utilisation and including the food stamps system to create inflation, food prices were increased. To have several structural adjustments in Zambia, the country was an effort to decrease the food subsidy for maize meal from 1970 to 1990s. The size of customer subsidy, like 1% of real sell prices, diversifies from year to year and peaked at 72% in 1977. It led to a mass shift of significant digit of poor consumers starting high worth of food in corn consumption. In 1989, the introduction of food coupons was the next significant change in food subsidy. Food coupons were made available only for urban, not for rural households, that too the number of dependents was limited to six, and a vital majority of exposed people were not capable of utilizing them. Though a small income country, Jamaica attained high levels of human development, excellent physical condition evidence, and improvements in nutritional standards from 1960 to 1985, which is visibly related to extensive public support. In 1984, general subsidies were removed and returned with targeted food stamps and school feeding systems also. It is affected inflation in food prices and food depreciated. The targeted system was not covered so much poor. In the middle income country of Tunisia, structural adjustments were introduced from 1986s onwards. The food system was universal without any quantitative restrictions. The improvements undertaken were dissimilar from other nations. It was a shift to a targeted system of food stamps. In order to reduce food subsidy, self-targeting and quality differentiations were introduced. The subsidy was given singly, and quota of subsidies and consumption decreased in unfavourable results on nutrition (Madhura, 2000).

4.1 Experiences in Indian context

The available in-kind transfer literature in India can be grouped into different empirical brackets. Many works have identified the problems of functioning in-kind transfers (PDS), leakages, diversions, targeted errors, institutional impact, views of politicians, less economic, physical access, high maintenance cost of PDS, and the like. On the other side, the success of in-kind transfers is related to computerized records, biometric systems and zero leakages in Chhattisgarh model, understanding the leakages, and related studies on quantitative and qualitative aspects suggest better improvement of poverty and functions of food transfers. All the positive and negative aspects are discussed below.

In India, the public distribution system has started during the Second World War, 1939 onwards. During that time, there was a shortage of essential commodities and keeps their responsibility of distribution to citizens. Some of the food items have supplied under the control of defence rules. The first time fair price shops were setting in major cities. The

world war ended; the cost of food items increased, particularly, wheat and rice (GoI, TPDS, 2005).

4.2 Poverty and Policies of PDS

A food policy committee was formed in 1943, and it tensioned the need for ongoing rationing in urban and certain rural areas. After the war, the ration shops had three different types of functioning. First, once is each cardholder received specified quantities of rationed items at fixed prices, it's called required rations, and only big cities covered. Second is an informal ration; however, its elastic as the quantum of rations depended on the availability of stocks. It's covered by urban and rural areas. Third is sectioning rations. It's covered by specified sections of people who were not producers of food grains, tea estate workers, and members of selected groups. But there were many complaints. Large sections of the population were not covered. The quality of products was bad, and prices were considered high (Gupta, 1977). In India, Public Distribution System had well established after famines. Food Grains Policy Commission (FGPC) was introduced in 1947, which re-examined the policy for Independent India. The commission has given advice to food controls, supply system, and trade of central buffer stock, it helps to farmers and consumers. In the 1950s, rations only in cities, it covered the population of 50,000, but in rural food supply was effected. After Food Corporation of India (FCI) came into action for food procured from the nations and international spring. It also maintained and supplied to PDS. From then onwards, the system became an integral element in the planning process mainly for reasons of poverty and nutrition (Ghose and Kumar, 1999) and Dreze (1982). The food policy changed in 1991 since universal coverage is not affordable for India. PDS was revamped in 1992. It was a very extensive distribution network to cover all the areas and all the people (Puri, 2012).

The food delivery system underwent several modifications with variations in names. Finally, it was called Targeted Public Distribution System from June 1997. The performance and evaluation report on it (GoI, TPDS, 2005) suggests that the highest cracks and wrong route of food grains and 42 percent of subsidizing food to reach targeted groups. There are problems for weaker sections, and reforms are needed in PDS. The study of Dreze and Sen (1989) is argued into different parts, like concepts of entitlements and capabilities including economic, social and political ideas, food shortages, scarcity, food crisis barriers, chronic undernourished and significantly eliminating hunger action. It will strength on food prices that are significant in India. During the drought of 1987-88, for instance, in spite, decreased food cultivation and food price increased. The important reason for price stabilization is the availability of land. PDS has also considerably added to increase the accessibility of food supply. The accessibility of food items improved, but it is very less level of grams. They conclude that demand for future provisional plans like health, education and food. The controversial characteristics of PDS, there are two main institutions were suggested FCI and CACP. These institutions primary duty is procurement, storage, transport and supply of food. Apart from procurement, distribution was also unequally extended (Bapna, 1992).

In the 1980s, welfare dimension gained ground in PDS, and many more rural areas were brought under its ambit in many states. After the 1980s the Indian agricultural sectors

built the new dimensions of production, market prices, well paid the price to farmers and notably announced the MSP. The rice and wheat grains are received minimum support price because of India concentrate on two dominant food grains. In MSP, it achieved a permanent feature for the huge stock with FCI. But PDS is not successive (Bhatia, 1991). He finds that within relatively well-off states in India such as Tamil Nadu, the poorest people fall outside the scheme. In the 1990s, PDS had the necessary to meet high subsidy, because prices were the difference in market and marginal. As a result, the off-take has less including other problems in PDS. It is a big question market of the uncertain future of PDS (Harris, 1991). In the other side, food transfer system functioning has two different policies. One is the opportunity of employment, and second most important is poverty control. It is safety net of short-run policy and impact of economic reforms in India (Mruthynajaya, 1993).

While advocating on revamping of PDS on specific issues and implications, three questions are raised: the data contraction period of 1973-89 is essentially governed by the fact that the PDS started becoming prominent, particularly after the drought of 1972-73. The result reveals that here have been important disparities in the state-wise PDS measures, concerning the total population or population covered by the PDS. The poor would benefit and improve with the food grain intake in states like Kerala, Jammu and Kashmir.

The restoring of PDS is not just a issue of focussing but also involves the creation and sustainability of the needed buildings like facilities of storage and allocation system, mostly in states like Orissa and Bihar. But targeting and redistribution will not be worked out for states like Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Utter Pradesh as it will not make any tangible difference to the consumption of the poor. PDS revamping would involve not only targeting but also importantly and substantially increasing the total quantum of cereals distribution. The restoring of PDS is not a matter of simple focussing which would involve a reduction in the required food grain quantity and hence of food subsidy. The food grains required for the revamped PDS would range from 20 to 52 million tonnes. The restoring of PDS is not a solution to the problem of budgetary deficit but a solution to the hardships probable to be obliged on the poor as a price of the structural adjustment policy (Geetha, et al., 1993). Almost after sixty years, the inception of PDS faced many issues and still debate on food policy. Since 1991, food transfer system has been undergone different structural reforms, importantly, that spend more on investing money. Some of the states have launched a high expansion of the PDS and assigned finance department for it (Mooij, 1998).

4.3 Alternatives and Politics of PDS

The study of Radhakrishna et al. (1997) highlighted the effect of PDS on poor households, the World Bank study argued in the cost-effective analysis of central and state subsidy to spend on high cost in food transfers. However, one rupee transfer to poor household, the government spends on high cost. In international experience, every country assumes the open-ended system. The food policy is a weak in the financial side but importantly impacts on agricultural conditions. Some other nations changed their food system. In India, it

should be kept on saved FCI financial assistances, supply to public relationship institutions through the type of food stamps or food vouchers or conditional cash grant. It will need to secure a plan for each class.

The food coupon system is an alternative to PDS. It is also argued that PDS, with its huge network, is costly and not well targeted in transferring income to the weak part of the society. At the same time, there are many bogus cards in the circulation that cause distraction of PDS articles to the marketplace. In the end, to streamline of PDS, the scheme of food coupon was implemented in Andhra Pradesh. It was first implemented for kerosene and extent to rice. The distribution of coupons is satisfactory as almost all the cardholders without much difficulty obtaining them. But in rural areas, they have not eliminated bogus cards. They are useful in checking the distraction of PDS goods to the marketplace. Distribution of food coupons involves time, workforce and money. They may, therefore, be distributed once in two years by increasing the number of coupons in the booklet (Indrakant et al., 2003). The main role of politics in the food supply system achieved in the state of Karnataka. It is major involvement in the food economy of India, decreases food insecurity and welfare state of Karnataka. In the state received subsidized food grains, every month with deft use of which the state enhanced its popularity to attract voters. But in Bihar, more than 80 per cent of food items were redirected to the marketplace. He concludes that politicians reaped a rich harvest in the PDS (Mooij, 1999). One kg rice at one rupee scheme was a success in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh. However, mobile van delivery in rural Odisha and computerised ration shops in Andhra Pradesh, in other to control with leakages (Mahendran, 2014).

4.4 Changes in Consumer Choice

Economic and physical actions in food items in all the areas were changed. It has consumer consumption option and availability of food transfer in PDS (Suryanarayana, 1994). In additional, the per capita consumption of grains like wheat, maize and other items are decreased in the poorest household particular in rural population. However, the taste of other homogenous products likes milk, meat, fish, etc. (Krishnaji, 2000). Different points out of that PDS functioning in city people, particularly those depend on the market for important of food items. The price is very less, and it is covered by the public. Many underserved sections of people have reaped the benefits of PDS (Taimni, 2001). The food grains regularly supply in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, consumers shift to the highest use of millets in urban and rural places. The main reasons are higher family members, and low monthly income, its benefits of health purpose (Mahendran, 2017).

4.5 Inclusion and Exclusion Errors

The selections of households received ration cards (BPL and AAY cards) under the targeted system. The country followed fixed rules of all the states. It will be affected by the selection of household on inclusion and exclusion errors. Only one-third of the houses have admittance to the PDS. The exercise of employing uniform norms across the

nation with little notice paid to variations in socio-economic and geographic conditions is also questionable. Another issue is whether the targeting errors examined here actually enhance or undermine the effectiveness of means testing (Khera, 2005). The need for universalisation of the PDS in a time of increasing costs is not applicable as more than four-fifths of houses in rural places and two-thirds of them in urban centres are previously covered up by it. It is highlighted on universal PDS system and procurement and food stocks. Rural and urban households buy rice and wheat through the PDS at reasonable prices. The real needed people buy food grains in rural and urban areas. It is not necessary to universal system and more targeting system running successful (Suryanarayana, 2008). The efficient of food delivered under this subsidy scheme measured larger distraction of food supposed for the poor. It has found many of inclusion and exclusion mistakes on account of defective data, chances and interfering by vested interests in the recognition of BPL and AAY beneficiaries. Supply as better access to food for the poor, least prices and suitable monitoring of the system and stringent punishment for offenders, together with the panchayat authorities for the incorrect recognition are the need of the hour. Finally, computerization of documentations for cross-checking, multi-tier checking of the quality of grains supplied and strengthening the role of NGOs in fighting dishonesty (Kumar, 2010).

4.6 Diversion of PDS

It estimates the amount of grains redirected through the PDS to the marketplace in the past years by matching official off-take figures with house procure accounted by NSS. On the basis of trends in periodical per capita procure of food grains through the PDS and calculated diversion, states are categorized into three groups-functioning states, reviving states and languishing states. The seven states in the first group is not astonishing as they have an excellent documentation of operation of social wellbeing systems (other than southern states, they include Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Maharashtra). The eight languishing states are not surprising. Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal have a poor record on other socio-economic meters also. The major five energizing states include Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Utter Pradesh. The first state is languishing after 2007-08 and catching up with the operation states. Here is obviously a necessitate for extra study that would assist to comprehend the poor presentation in some states and causes behind the development in others (Khera, 2011).

4.7 Success and Realize of PDS

In India, the state of Chhattisgarh PDS model has highly achieved and succeeded. Because of better transactions, customers received regular food in a month. In the majority of households, they are not interested in cash benefits transfers. Behind of success, the PDS shifted all the ration shops from private to community establishments like gram panchayats, Self-help groups and co-operative society. The government decided to deliver food grains directly to ration shops and engaged trucks for doorstep delivery of PDS food grains (Puri,

2012). Dreze (2013) argues that the all India level PDS has reduced the gap of poverty index in rural areas. In rural measurements are well impacts, particular in Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh states.

The leakages in the community allocation scheme (Dreze, 2015) try to solve the mystery with the help of recent data, remaining high leakages, in some areas improved in recent days, particularly in Bihar PDS model. However, the process of PDS reform has SECC data to identify eligible households. Bihar was able to prepare to issue a new list of ration cards with transparency linked with SECC data which is a major improvement over the earlier delays of other state SECC data. The main reason of leakages is the APL allocation. In rural areas has improved. Still, PDS has long-running to go insuring the reliable, transparent and corruption-free. The experiences, including Socio-economic and Caste Census data analyzed based on the implementation of the Act that is much interested to other states, especially the poor and poorly governed states like Jharkhand, MP and UP. The state PDS reforms include unannounced visits to ration shops whenever possible. The tight schedule of household interviews made it possible to inspect only 23 ration shops. Bihar had once relied on the coupon system to prevent embezzlement and neglected other safeguards in contrast with neighbouring states like Chhattisgarh and Odisha where wide-ranging PDS reforms have drastically reduced PDS leakages. Though the state has a record of corruption and misgovernance, the recent progress with PDS reforms as well as the implementation of NFSA clearly shows a welcome change (Dreze, 2015).

Considering the different challenges, it should be framed from a people-centric perspective. The food security question for India is as to how the substantive freedom of the poor and malnourished can be improved so that these sections of the populace can face their food security requirements. Here is no single reply to this problem. The simple fact of framing the problem in this way opens up the need for holistic analysis that is fundamentally about the security of livelihood and provision of an extended belief of honesty for most weak of the populace. With this in mind, attention has now turned to the future challenge of feeding India in a way that prioritizes the food and nutrition security of the poor (Bill Pritchard et al., 2014). The new state Telangana needs food security. The study estimates the influence of various determinants on per capita food grains production and consumption in the household sector. In addition, the performance of PDS, the experience of the procurement system in Chhattisgarh and the important weapons to fight urban food insecurity like (NTR, AMMA) canteen and private initiatives in the provision of food security issues are discussed. Finally, strong recommendations of food and PDS are more necessary in the state of Telangana (Indrakant, 2017). Swaminathan, (2013) and 198 economists and social activists in India strongly support old-age pension, widows' pension, maternity entitlements and scholarships. They are against cash transfer and UID. For reasons are caused havoc and massive social exclusion. However, price rises could quickly erode the purchasing power of cash transfers as rural markets are often poorly developed, poor and absence of banking system in rural areas and inability to handle large volumes of small cash transfers. The special groups such as single women, disabled persons, and the elderly cannot easily move around to withdraw their cash and buy food from distant markets. An impression had been created that the government is all set to launch UID to

enable cash transfers on a mass scale before the 2014 elections. This was misleading and looked like an attempt to make people rush to UID enrolment centres. This statement as well redirected concentration from the government's malfunction to act out NFSA. The necessitate of the hour is a all-inclusive NFSA and not a potentially disorderly rush for UID driven cash transfers.

4.8 Preference of PDS

The dynamic issues of market and prices frequently persuade the references of people. Though this is hard to simplify about them, a few broad outlines can be distinguished. As a consequence of seasonal price fluctuations, beneficiaries frequently wish food in the lean season and cash around the yield time. Usually, in-kind transfers lean to be the option when costs are high. It was evidently recorded in the case of Ethiopia in the unexpected raise in wheat costs in 2008 (Devereux, 2010).

The general issues in India's PDS are not operating generally in rural and urban areas. The national study suggests that 84-88 percent of the stakeholders are received their full entitlement. The majority of preferred by food transfers in Bihar where the PDS is still in poor condition. In particular, the study shows that inclinations hinged on the implementation of the PDS. In states where the system worked poor people preferred cash, but where the existing food allocation worked well, a majority of them preferred food. In addition, improving the PDS is a more reasonable method to go forward (Khera, (2011). The direct benefit transfer based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis (Khera, 2013) examines the pros and cons of cash and in-kind transfers. The respondent had a deep thinking two choices, once is cash and second is food. The majority of respondents are selected only food, selection of the existing theory cash transfers. The cash transfer policy choice depends on the political context in which it is explored.

Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan (2011), an NGO, conducted a pilot study on the choice between PDS and cash transfers in Delhi. It was conducted in slums, resettlement colonies with fewer people in most cases, even those in the APL category were not well off. It is found that the PDS needs reforms to reach its beneficiaries effectively. About 92 per cent of respondents prefer PDS to cash transfer. The poor received direct cash transfers of a fixed sum of ₹1000. The cash transfer schemes relate to identification issues and the arbitrary manner in which BPL cards have been issued. Frequent policy changes such as stamping of cards, use of biometrics without informing people or making proper arrangements result in many being denied their entitlement which worsens the situation.

4.9 Women's Perception of PDS

Gender is another key factor in shaping preferences as women may use reserves in a different way from men (Doss, 2013). In many communities, they lean to wish food, and they are more likely to manage, while men may wish cash transfers. Nitya Rao (2013) highlighted the feminist point of view that prefers the DCTs in India. She argues that the dangers of replacing the supply of food grains and other commodities through the PDS (Food) are often

seen to lie in women's domain, cash by the same argument becomes a male asset. Women are the recipients of food entitlement within the household; if paid in cash, it would not only undermine household food security but also enhance violence against women. A pilot study of Konwar et al., (2013) found that cash in women's hands is formed case studies of two unconditional cash transfers in slums of Delhi and rural villages of Indore, Madhya Pradesh. The structured interview and interaction were conducted among the women of BPL households. The study found that cash transfers created a sense of empowerment and security within and outside their families. The cash transfers bring desired changes among women and probes the difficulty in rural places in much the same. A few women respondents mourned that the cash deposited in their accounts is vehemently taken away by their husbands/brothers who are drug addicts and drunkards (Indrakant et al., 2017).

5. Evidence of DBT in Developing Countries

In India, cash transfer debate is discussed strongly in recent years but only received experiences in underdeveloped countries (Dreze and Sen, 2011). Assessed under-nutrition in India notes the Latin American experience and argues that the possibility of introducing cash transfer in India should be explored (Gragnotati, 2006). The Government of India publicly endorsed this thinking in its Economic Survey for 2009-2010 (GoI, 2010), suggesting that the PDS should be replaced with DCTs. The available reviews of cash transfer in developing countries are discussed below. The World Bank study concludes that agricultural production and equitable argument of cash versus food transfer policy should be addressed the important root of food insecurity. Cash system has many advantages related to delivery and in most cases are cost-saving as against food transfers. It is essentially a practical way that is needed to the best understanding of poor, monitoring and implementation of such ideas (Gentilini, 2007).

In another, the finding of World Bank study shows that public schemes are necessary for the women to earn the cash transfer, and it makes them pride for their contribution to their family. A comparison with other policies with similar transfer amounts reveals that, for married women, there is some advantage to have cash transfers over in-kind transfers and for widows, divorced and separated women, and it is advantageous to have both food and cash transfers. Finally, these welfare policy measures have an important role in helping ultra-poor households. They cannot be the sole mechanism for sustainable poverty reduction. Instead, they should be seen as one component of a portfolio of activities designed to eradicate poverty (Ahmed et al., 2009).

A pilot study in Zimbabwe concerning the cash transfer system analyses the data on expenditure of the cash transfer, the use of food aid and the proportional local spending of all the economic factors in the region. Comparable multipliers are used to demonstrate the market impact of each intervention. The results show that cash transfer has a much bigger impact on local markets than food aid. It concludes that cash transfer is a market perspective, the existence of a higher multiplier for providing cash transfer than food aid in response to the humanitarian crisis. It illustrates that giving cash transfer was helpful not just for beneficiaries but for the local market and communities (Staunton et al., 2010).

The cash transfer system has to remove the public distribution system, its means that the poverty reduction is the incorrect way of CT performance. The real questions are related to the number of beneficiaries, the quantum of money transfer and mode of utilization of CT. They provide cash transfer for poor, and it will be a choice of them (depends on household conditions). The issues like targeting mistakes and distraction from praiseworthy beneficiaries are probable to be extra uttered with cash transfers. They cannot be removed through technical fixes like the UID or in the form of the latest fad of the international development industry (Ghosh, 2011).

Mexico's CCTs scheme, which covers the education of children for a certain age, provides health service continually narrated as an excellent outcome. It was covered by 5.8 million families in 2011 with a budget of 4.8 billion dollars. Besides, there are other welfare schemes. Mexico has become an exporter of social technology and policy. The Basic Income (BI) initiative by unconditional, universal, guaranteed and individual life is shown to be a powerful alternative as it overcomes the problems of inclusions and exclusion errors (Yanes, 2011). The unconditional cash transfer system of Congo has no evidence. The getting cash transfers of households were used to purchase alcohol. The cash transfers system found a minimal impact of total food expenditure (Aker et al., 2013).

The comparative study of food and cash (particular nutrition status of a country) systems in developing countries. It will give impressive and positive ideas of nutrition support of cash transfer system. The cash received households were invested in agricultural inputs; they received higher income in the future. The food and cash delivery system have benefited to poor in different way (Hoddinott, 2014). One of the other developing countries like Northern Ecuador implemented three different varieties of food subsidies. One is cash transfers, second is food transfers, and third is food vouchers, it helps to control the leakages and other targeting systems. The study suggests that food transfers and food vouchers are notably better accessed, including food consumption are increased. Finally, the cash transfer credited delivery issues (Hidrobos, 2014). In recent years, the argument of cash versus food debate has increased in developing countries. Its effect cannot be generalised, in difference emerges time; it will be useful for consumption. In some countries, they consider that the cash transfer system must consider with other welfare programmes like old-age pensions, mid-day meals (Gentilini, 2016).

5.1 Cost-effectiveness of PDS

Considering the cost-effectiveness of PDS in India after the Government of India's budget for 2010-11, the Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee appointed a task force to recommend reforms of LPG, kerosene and fertilizer subsidies. The following report recommended transition to direct transfer of cash payments that would be connected to beneficiaries UID cards (Task force LKF). Importantly, it argues that attempts to improve the current fair price shops via in-kind allocation are simply not worth the effort. It is easy to respond to arguments about the need to clamp down on maladministration and criminality by asking for better policing (Basu, 2010). The cash transfer scheme is a powerful tool to reduce fiscal deficit, which could also bring down inflation, estimating that the breakdown of

total costs of the food subsidy delivered through the PDS are 43 per cent constitute illegal diversion, 28 per cent excess cost, 19 per cent income transfer to the non-poor, only 10 per cent is the transfer to the poor. The extra costs refer to the purchase and distribution costs spent by the government in excess, and these costs are substantial (Ramaswami et al., 2010). The recent Economic Survey, 2007-08 Government of India, spent ₹1.80 crore for BPL families particular in the food distribution system. It means the per month transfer to ₹2,140 per households. It compares to the poverty line of rural and urban; this expenditure is high (Kapur, 2008). Contestations of the first argument by M.Shahhas related to removing the PDS and MGNREGA are the wrong side of the discussion. It is not only considered with anti-poverty measures and reduction, but also limited resources are available in India. In Shah's point of view, many other points are acceptable, needed to more improvement of the new system of DBT. The government decision is not a political part of technology; it is considering the public view. It is also a permanent political solution of India (Kapur, 2008). The Government of India has launched a scheme through which CTs will exchange some of the grants for fertilizers and LPGs. While there is no doubt, it will move to a cash transfer for other cases, its benefits (short run-long run) to both sides also (Kapur, 2011).

5.2 Social Security Scheme

United Nations Development Programme (2009) (UNDP) held a discussion on conditional CTs for alleviating human poverty in India. The study discussed different respondents of the advantages, sensibility of announcing conditional cash transfers, and it will be reducing poverty. The conditional cash transfers may examine the broader social policy in developing countries. India's targeted unconditional CTs are little used and have been hardly evaluated. Used NFHS data and carried survey in Karnataka (2005) and Rajasthan (2006). It is observed that social pension scheme is well reached with low-level leakages and the amounts have moved to larger poor households. A comparison with the PDS reveals a relatively low level of leakages in it. The success of a social pension scheme would expand the coverage among widows and elderly and increase the amount of the pension. This is the path which the government has already embarked upon (Dutta, 2010).

World most massive cash transfer scheme is Brazil's Fome Zero. This scheme attained remarkable achievement to reduce poverty-the best example, when the customer's purchasing power increase and it controlled the inflation. In India, cash transfer design is not suitable because of institutional issues. Including, India has a number of traditional schemes like the entire of PDS, support prices, FPSs and FCI with state-level entities that were set up because India felt the market would not distribute the goods to the poor. An institutional substitute was necessary, so there was a need to create institutions and provide goods and services to the poor (Vyasulu, 2010).

5.3 Advantages of Cash Transfers

He writes are that cash transfers propose a lot of benefits which are food transfers too and that their plan can address possible drawbacks as pointed out by reviewers. The article does not recommend that the central government disbands the PDS and puts a system of

cash transfers in its place. The decision of the state governments which are responsible for delivering social protection such as welfare schemes that may find a way to mobilize new constituencies in democratic politics. A centralized formulaic approach of food subsidies risks the loss of sensible innovations in social protection and politics (Kotwal, 2011). The reviewed empirical evidence of different kinds of cash transfer of food and nutrition, health and education across the world concludes that the efficiency of cash transfer is the highly content dependent and in-kind transfer for a large class of food and health-related involvement and cash assisted kind transfers for agricultural inputs in the form of vouchers (Narayanan, 2011). The design of cash transfer system involves a balancing power of policy concern, benefits of targeting coverage and practices. The study concludes that, to implement the CCTs more successful in reducing poverty and promoting higher education, health care system efforts should be stepped up for service provision and qualities that are achieved in low and middle-income countries (Baslagli, 2011).

Applauds India's PDS as the world's largest food distribution scheme, and the largest welfare programme operated by the Government of India, analyses pros and cons of the case, replacing a reformed version of this system with a focussed and distinguished cash transfer scheme which could cover about two-thirds of households and make for larger transfer to the poorest compared to real grant embedded in the current system, eliminating the right of large exclusion. In addition, general budget can be held at the current lay out stage. It highlights the functioning of the TPDS till date and discusses the case for replacing it with targeted CT scheme. Many oppositions related to such a transfer system can be avoided at the plan level. In addition, it points out that in the proposed scheme of CT, no general equilibrium results have been taken into consideration, but only direct ones. While there are many potential roundabout results, concerns are always raised that providing unconditional cash or subsidised food to poor households will direct to reduced workforce. On another hand, it is well established that higher income leads to improved diet quality in India, especially the intake of proteins and micronutrients, which boost labour productivity significantly. Another concern is that higher incomes of the poor will increase demand for food and shoot up food costs (Svedberg, 2012).

Standing (2012) argues that the cash transfer debates about changing in family status, individual buying capacity. In other economic impacts, inequality and improve the social status. As part of the cash transfer design, it creates a free-market economy, and it is called the neo-liberal economic model. It makes privatization and commercialization feasible, tolerable and advisable to a state-based social safety system in public service. The introduction of a basic income transfer system is in the tribal villages of Madhya Pradesh. This new system creates increased households assets, particularly in livestock and transport, which enables them to use their original. The CTs were made in women's accounts who had their own household choices (Sewa Bharat, 2014). Experimental Cash Transfers in Raghbir Nagar at Delhi, 2012, covered 450 householders each of which received Rs.1000/- per month. Overall, 60 per cent of BPL families find in cash transfer advantages and while others prefer the direct food option. Preference of CT necessitates the opening of a bank account. Another significant issue is the lack of financial inclusion, even in urban areas. It is strongly suggested 'free choice method' or 'cash or food' option

where BPL families are allowed. The option can be introduced gradually to allow for mid-term course changes. The findings show that there is no decrease in the availability of any food item due to cash transfer, which does not adversely affect food security. Besides, cash transfer creates an chance for houses to raise other nutritious food choices (Sewa Bharat, 2015).

The Economic Research and Training Foundation in India reveals that the direct cash transfer will prove a big game-changer for government in transforming India into a globalised market economy. The policy also meets the 'STEEPLE' parameters namely, S: Socially desirable, T: Technologically viable, E: Economically feasible, E: Environment friendly, P: Politically expedient, L: Legally in order, and E: Ethically correct (p10, IMC ERTF). Cash transfer schemes cover a wide range of policies designed at providing an increased level of purchasing power in the hands of the poor and adding to their purchasing power. It is an important policy recommendation for poverty alleviation. The study insists that the efficacy of cash transfer over the PDS, improving nutritional outcomes. The provision of subsidy in terms of grains at lower prices is in any case equivalent to a significant cash transfer since poor households can sell their allotted grains in the open market for an equal cash amount. The PDS does nothing but functions as a wasteful intermediary whose procurement policies regularly distort market outcomes. Cash transfers empower the beneficiary instead of placing him/her at the mercy of the provider (Panagariya, 2008). The present PDS system faced high leakages. It is suggested that there is a case for changing the support to poor, highly food subsidized policy to income policy of cash transfer through JDY and UID. It controlled leakages, the subsidies to reach the poor (Gulati et al. 2015).

5.4 Cash Support to Nutrition Security

The PDS has unsuccessful in vast parts of the nation (quantity and quality of food grains). It needs to offer nutritional support to the poor and needs to do genuine reforms in it. Some studies examine the differential impacts. On nutrition of cash versus food transfers as offered to men and women, qualitative research gives slightly on the intra-community effect of cash transfer, some of which are positive and empowering others may produce underside results concerning societal relations. An unconditional cash transfer to a group of households as a replacement of food security by means of BPL cards. It is argued that unconditional cash transfers do not lead to a decline in food security, however provide opportunities for houses to move to other nutritious choices in the non-cereal section (Gangopadhyay, 2012).

Focuses on the existing PDS on which NFSA so heavily, and says that it provides the so-called food security to the targeted populace. What is the opinion of the people regarding the alternative mechanism for benefits, namely cash transfers vis-à-vis the PDS itself? The study found that the PDS provides no measurable impact on the level of nutritional attainment of households. There are no identifiable patterns of improvement and it is functioning. It also identified the overall preference of households for cash transfer in the place of the PDS, while BPL and AAY households are uncertain as to their preferences (Baskey, 2013).

5.5 Practice in LPG and Fertilizers

The proposed system of DCTs for fertilizers faces the difficult problem of identification of beneficiaries (BPL cards, farmer cards with landholding, etc.), which would make targeting very difficult. DCTs for fertilizers have a direct boundary with the market and incentives for adequate and appropriate deliver at diverse stages of the supply chain necessitate to be conserved. The inequity in the use of diverse fertilizers is also rising trouble. He points out that the variety from the very large number of beneficiaries to volatile fertilizer prices, necessitating market price indexation of cash transfers and controlling the market power of dealers, especially in remote areas. If it is designed properly, direct cash transfers will be attended by important asset in soil testing and the payments must be fixed to a balanced use of fertilizers, including micronutrients. The DBT could be modified into conditional cash transfers for fertilizers for its optimal mix-use (Kishore, 2013). This study analyzed the direct cash transfer subsidy in (LPG) and concluded that few difficulties were faced in the process of direct cash transfers in urban areas (Gangwar, 2013).

5.6 Cash for Health Benefits

In 2005, National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) announced Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY). The result suggests that JSY is performance, practically women receiving incentive after delivering in a government facility, locating of getting incentive, transfer of amounts and sum of brides. Most crucial play role of JSY is to provide social health care, delivery in a medical facility in government hospitals (Dongre, 2013). The conditional cash benefits are given by Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddy, Maternity Benefit Scheme in Tamil Nadu. Pregnant women received money benefits have 3 instalments (each instalment ₹4000). It will benefit to women and child (food and immunization purpose). The received cash benefits are distributed through nationalized banks without any delay (Mahendran, 2014).

6. Conclusion

6.1 Understanding of Food Replaces Cash

Radhakrishna (2018) argued that the recently announced direct benefit system in Puducherry and Chandigarh experiences. The cash transfer amount is very less ₹115 in Puducherry and ₹95 in Chandigarh. A customer troubled to withdraw money from the bank, fill forms, it is greatly crowding, and poor functioning of ATMs in rural areas. The Puducherry PDS (food transfer system) is well functioning across the state by updated computerized information like SMS, Biometric ration card system, and thumb press method make sure reliability of distribution (Mahendran, 2018). Finally, the welfare policies are running better in an exacting state must not be anxious, and the direct benefit (cash) transfer should replace only those welfare policies, which are not functioning successfully. The more packaged welfare policies should be defined by states. This involves that cash amount given to targeted households may be different from one area to another. The study also found that the cash transfer system covers only adults not children under the age of 15years in the state

of Puducherry in India. (Mahendran et al., 2017). Including, number of research papers were reviewed and discussed above on the subject of food and cash transfer policy in India and other developing countries. Out of that food transfer system is better measured like price and quantity of food grains for each household member. However, the new policy of cash transfer system is not measured yet (conditional and unconditional cash transfer also) across the world. This review paper strongly suggests that the measurement of cash transfer is required and it enables to determine the need and adequacy of each household member in the family.

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